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SCIENTER IN SEC INJUNCTIVE PROCEEDINGS
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,1 the Supreme Court established
"scienter"2 as a necessary element of a private damage action under sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)3 and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder.4 The Court 'declined, however, to address
specifically whether proof of scienter is required in injunctive actions by
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
This note will use the term "scienter" to refer to a degree of culpability greater than
negligence. The term scienter has eluded, however, a uniform definition in the securities
litigation context. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court
referred initially to scienter as proscribing conduct evinced by an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. Id. at 193 n.12. In subsequent references to the phrase, however,
the Hochfelder Court implied that the term scienter encompassed mental states ranging
from intent, to knowledge of falsity, to recklessness. See Bucklo, The Supreme Court At-
tempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv.
213, 218-220 (1977). The prevailing view in the federal circuit courts is that reckless behavior
constitutes scienter. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir.
1980); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1336-38
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastmnan Dillon & Co., 570 F.2Md 38,
44-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court relied upon language in
Hochfelder in defining the scienter term. Aaron contains conflicting language on the degree
of culpability necessary to establish scienter. Initially, the Court referred to scienter as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 686 n.5. In a subse-
quent reference, however, the Aaron Court noted that "knowing or intentional miscoriduct"
sufficed as proof of scienter. Id. at 696. In addition, the Supreme Court reserved the ques-
tion whether scienter embraces recklessness. Id. at 686 n.5.
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) makes it
unlawful for any person ... (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking authority of
the SEC, rule 10b-5 provides
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).' Federal courts con-
sidering this issue subsequent to Hochfelder have expressed conflicting
views concerning the degree of culpability necessary to support an SEC
action for injunctive relief.' The Supreme Court's decision in Aaron v.
SEC7 established clearly that the SEC must prove scienter in a civil en-
forcement proceeding to enjoin violations of section 17(a)(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act),8 section 10(b) of the '34 Act, and Commis-
sion rule 10b-5.1
Aaron, the petitioner, was a managerial employee of E.L. Aaron &
Company, an SEC registered broker-dealer." His principal duties involved
the supervision of E.L. Aaron's registered representatives and the
maintenance of the firm's files for those securities in which the firm
acted as a market maker." While supervising the activities of the firm's
registered representatives, Aaron learned that two representatives
made false and misleading statements concerning Lawn-A-Mat Chemical
and Equipment Corporation ("LAM"), a company in which E.L. Aaron
was a market maker." Since he was responsible for LAM's due diligence
See 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1978) (SEC must prove
scienter in injunctive action under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5)
with SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter
not element of SEC injunctive action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5) and SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976) (scienter not required in SEC injunctive
actions under § 17(a) of Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)).
446 U.S. 680 (1980).
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides
It shall be unlawful for any persons in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly (1) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
446 U.S. at 701-02.
,o See SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446
U.S. 680 (1980). E.L. Aaron & Co. was Aaron's father's firm. Although Aaron worked as his
father's assistant, he held no official corporate title. Id. He was not registered with the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers as a principal of E.L. Aaron & Co. Id. Aaron
asserted at trial that his lack of corporate title insulated him from liability for employees'
actions. Id at 617. The trial court and the Second Circuit held injunctive relief could issue
against Aaron despite his lack of title, since he exercised supervisory control over the
employees. Id.
," 446 U.S. at 682. See generally Bloomenthal, Market-Makers, Manipulators and Shell
Games, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 597 (1971) (discussing role of market maker).
"2 446 U.S. at 683. Aaron supervised the two registered representatives who operated
E.L. Aaron & Co.'s Roslyn Heights, New York sales office. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 614, 615
(2d Cir. 1979). In soliciting orders for the common stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equip-
ment Corporation ("LAM"), the two registered representatives falsely informed prospective
purchasers of LAM stock that LAM was producing new products and that the corporation
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files, Aaron had reason to know of the false and misleading nature of the
two representatives' statements."3 Although the representatives were
under his direct control and supervision, Aaron did not take affirmative
action to prevent the representatives from continuing their deceptive
practices." The SEC commenced suit seeking preliminary and final in-
junctive relief under section 20(b) of the '33 Act' 5 and section 21(d) of the
'34 Act. 6 The Commission alleged specifically that Aaron had violated
and aided and abetted violations of section 17(a), section 10(b), and rule
10b-5 by failing to take adequate steps to prevent the fraudulent prac-
tices of the registered representatives from continuing.'
7
A federal district court concluded that Aaron violated and aided and
abetted violations of the three securities provisions and granted injunc-
tive relief.8 Although the district court noted that proof of negligence
alone may have satisfied the culpability standard in a Commission civil
enforcement proceeding, the district court found that Aaron's inten-
was financially stable. 446 U.S. at 682-83. At the time these statements were made, LAM
was losing money. Id. at 683. Several prospective investors complained to LAM officials
about the representatives' statements. Id. An LAM officer warned the representatives to
cease their deceptive acts. Id. An LAM attorney also contacted Aaron on two occasions and
informed him that the registered representatives were making false and misleading
statements. Id.
"1 446 U.S. at 683. Representatives of a broker-dealer or underwriter hold a "due
diligence" meeting shortly after registration statement becomes effective to question of-
ficials of the issuing corporation on corporate affairs disclosed in a registration statement.
See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW 8.15(3)(a) (1980)
[hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL]. The broker-dealer or underwriter holds this meeting
and keeps records of any meetings or conversations with the issuing corporation's officials
for the purpose of establishing due diligence in the registration transaction. Id. Aaron had
access to the LAM due diligence records and files. The reports in the LAM due diligence
files indicated the deteriorating financial condition of LAM and revealed that LAM had no
plans for new products. 446 U.S. at 683. Upon receiving information from LAM's attorney
about the registered representatives' statements, Aaron had reason to know, therefore,
that the statements were false and misleading. Id.
11 446 U.S. at 483. Aaron's only action upon learning of the misstatements was to re-
quest one of the representatives to speak with the LAM attorney concerning the matter. Id.
Is 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976). Section 20(b) of the '33 Act permits the SEC to seek tem-
porary or permanent injunction in federal district court to enjoin any person violating or
about to violate the '33 Act or rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.
Is 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). Section 21(d) of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to seek an in-
junction against any person violating or about to violate the provisions of the '34 Act or
rules or regulations promulgated thereunder. Id.
17 446 U.S. at 684. The SEC's complaint named seven defendants in addition to Aaron.
These other seven defendants consented to injunctions before trail. Id.
"8 SEC v. Aaron, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043, at 91,687
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The district
court found that Aaron had intentionally failed to discharge his supervisory responsibility
to stop the representatives from making statements that Aaron knew were false and
misleading. The district court reasoned that injunctive relief was warranted in light of the
nature of the violations, Aaron's failure to recognize the wrongful nature of his conduct, and
the reasonable likelihood of future misconduct. 446 U.S. at 684-85.
19811
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tional failure to prevent the vidlations from continuing established
scienter and eliminated the need to rely on a negligence standard.'9 On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's injunction."0 The
appellate court held, however, that the district court's finding of scienter
was unnecessary because in a Commission enforcement proceeding proof
of negligence sufficed to establish a defendant's violation of the federal
securities laws.
2
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Aaron to
resolve the federal court controversy concerning whether the SEC must
establish scienter as an element in injunctive actions to enjoin violations
of section 17(a) of the '33 Act, section 10(b) of the '34 Act, and rule 10b-5.'
The SEC urged that differences between the nature of private damage
actions and injunctive actions, the policy considerations underlying the
securities laws demanded that courts apply a negligence standard in
Commission injunctive actions.' In addition, the Commission argued
that the language and legislative history of section 17(a), section 10(b),
and rule 10b-5 supported application of a negligence standard in
SEC enforcement proceedings. 24 The Supreme Court partially rejected
the SEC's arguments, finding that the plain meaning of the statutory
language and legislative history of section 17(a)(1), section 10(b), and rule
10b-5 manifested Congress' intent to prescribe a scienter requirement in
all actions pursuant to the three provisions. 5 The Court held, however,
that the Commission need not establish scienter as an element to enjoin
violations of section 17(a)(2) and section 17(a)(3). 6 The Aaron Court
vacated the Second Circuit's decision and remanded the case to the Sec-
ond Circuit. 7
The Aaron Court felt constrained by the Court's analysis in
Hochfelder of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, finding that scienter was an
element of a private damage action. 8 The Hochfelder Court concluded
'" SEC v. Aaron, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043, at 91,685
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); see 446 U.S. at 684.
2 SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 619-24 (2d Cir. 1979).
21 Id. at 619; see 446 U.S. at 685-86.
' See 446 U.S. at 686.
" Id- at 691-92. The Commission asserted that SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) should control the construction of § 10(b) in SEC civil enforcement
proceedings. 446 U.S. at 691-92. In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court noted that the re-
quisite elements of proof in a common law fraud action in equity were less severe than the
elements of proof in actions at law. 375 U.S. at 192-94. The Aaron Court did not find Capital
Gains determinative of the Commission's standard of proof in actions under § 10(b). 446
U.S. at 695; see text accompanying notes 34-41 and 80-110 infra.
" 446 U.S. at 694 n.11, 699. See also text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
446 U.S. at 690-700; see text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
26 446 U.S. at 697; see text accompanying notes 46-52 infra.
446 U.S. at 701-02.
Id. at 689-90. Hochfelder involved a private action for damages against an account-
ing firm for securities laws violations. 425 U.S. at 188-89. The president of a brokerage firm
induced plaintiffs to invest in a securities scheme. Id. The president converted the invested
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that the terms "manipulative," "deceptive," "device," and "contrivance"
used in section 10(b) suggested that Congress intended to prescribe a
culpability standard for a section 10(b) violation based ofily oh "knowing
or intentional misconduct."' The Hochfelder Court found no contrary
congressional intent in the history of the '34 Act." The SEC's rulemak-
ing authority consists only of the power to adopt regulations to carry
into effect Congress' intent as expressed in the statutory provisions of
the federal securities laws." Accordingly, the standard of culpability of
section 10(b) also must control the construction of rule 10b-5.2' Reasoning
that the language and legislative history of section 10(b) apply to both in-
junctive actions and private damage actions, the Aaron Court concluded
that scienter is an element of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violations,
regardless of the plaintiff's identity.
3
The Supreme Court in Aaron also noted that SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.34 did not mandate the application of a negligeiice
standard in Commission enforcement proceedings under section 10(b)
funds to his own use. After the president committed suicide, plaintiff investors brought suit
against the accounting firm retained to periodically audit the brokerage firm's books. Id. at
188-90. Plaintiffs charged the accounting firm with failing to conduct proper audits that
would have discovered the fraudulent practices of the brokerage firm's president. Id. at 190.
The plaintiffs alleged that the accounting firm violated § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. As a
defense, the accounting firm asserted that a cause of action could not lie under § 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 on allegations of negligence. Id. at 191.
The Hochfelder Court focused on three factors to determine that a scienter require-
ment existed under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Id. at 197-212. Two of these factors, the statutory
language and legislative history of § 10(b), are relevant to a determination of whether
scienter is required in SEC injunctive actions. 446 U.S. at 691. The Aaron Court concluded
that the third factor, the interrelationship of the antifraud provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts,
was not relevant in enforcement proceedings. Id. at 691 n.9. See also Note, 1975-1976
Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 33 WASH. & LEE L. Rvv. 937, 937-44 (1976).
425 U.S. at 197; see text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
o 425 U.S. at 201-02. The Hochfelder Court conceded that the legislative history of the
'34 Act "is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent." Id. at 201. The Court
focused, however, on a statement by a spokesman for the original drafters describing § 9(c),
the predecessor to § 10(b), as a "catch-all" provision to prevent "manipulative" and "cun-
ning" devices. Id. at 202-03 quoting Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934). The Hoch-
felder Court also rejected the SEC's contention that the absence of an explicit willfulness require-
ment, which appears in § 9 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78(i) (1976), demonstrated congressional in-
tent to require only proof of negligence under § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 207-08. The Court noted that
where Congress intended to recognize liability for negligent conduct, Congress used different
language from that appearing in § 10(b). Id. at 208-10.
3' 425 U.S. at 213-14; see 446 U.S. at 691; Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965).
425 U.S. at 214.
" 446 U.S. at 691. As further support for holding that the language and legislative
history of § 10(b) apply to injunctive actions, the Aaron Court noted that at the time Con-
gress enacted § 10(b), the legislature did not contemplate an implied private cause of action.
Id.; see text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
375 U.S. 180 (1963).
1981]
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and rule 10b-5.15 In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court found persuasive
the legislative history of section 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940 ('40 Act)6 and SEC policy arguments that the Commission need
not prove a defendant-investment adviser acted with scienter to enjoin
his deceptive practices. 7 Analogizing an action under the antifraud pro-
visions of the '40 Act with a common law fraud action, the Capital Gains
Court held that the "mild prophylactic" effect of a Commission injunc-
tion made requiring proof of scienter in SEC enforcement proceedings
unnecessary. 8 The Aaron Court distinguished Capital Gains because sec-
tion 206(2) legislative history and statutory language indicated the
absence of a scienter requirement." Moreover, section 206(2) regulates a
fiduciary relationship. Even under common law fraud principles, a plain-
tiff need not establish scienter in a damage suit against a fiduciary." The
Aaron Court refused to adopt the Capital Gains reasoning because sec-
tion 10(b) applies to both fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships and
contains specific language indicating the existence of a scienter require-
ment.41
446 U.S. at 691-95.
s, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). Section 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 ('40
Act) provides
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly ... (2) to engage in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any client or prospective client.
' 375 U.S. at 186-97. The defendants in Capital Gains were publishers of investment
advisory services. On six different occasions, the defendants purchased securities in ad-
vance of recommending the same securities in their investment advisory publications. Id. at
182-83. In each instance the market price of the security increased after the recommenda-
tions appeared in the investment advisory services. Id. at 183. The defendants did not
disclose their interests in the recommended securities to clients or prospective clients of the
investment advisory services. Id. The SEC commenced suit seeking preliminary injunctive
relief against the defendants' activities. Id. The Commission requested an injunctive order
compelling the defendants in the future to disclose material facts concerning their involve-
ment in securities that the defendants recommended through their publications. Id.
Id. at 193-94. But see text accompanying notes 86-110 infra.
446 U.S. at 693-95. The Aaron Court observed that the language in § 206(2), which
proscribes "any ... practice ... which operates.... as a fraud or deceit," focuses on the ef-
fect of an action, rather than on the intent of an investment adviser. Id. at 694; see note 36
supra. In addition, the Capital Gains Court concluded that the legislative history of the '40
Act indicated that Congress did not intend to require proof of scienter. 375 U.S. at 191-92.
The Capital Gains Court noted that the congressional reports expressed Congress' desire to
eliminate "all conflicts of interest which incline an investment adviser-consciously or un-
consciously-to render advice which was not disinterested." Id.
" 446 U.S. at 694. An investment adviser owes a fiduciary duty to his client not to
deceive the client. See 375 U.S. at 190 (quoting Hearings on S. 3580 before Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 719 (1939) (relation-
ship between investment adviser and client based on "trust and confidence")). The Capital
Gains Court acknowledged that intent to deceive was not an element of a common law fraud
action against a fiduciary. 375 U.S. at 193-94; see note 96 infra.
41 446 U.S. at 694-95. Section 10(b) extends to the acts of "any person ... in connection
with the purchase and sale of securities." See note 3 supra. Section 206, however, prohibits
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In determining whether scienter is an element in SEC injunctive ac-
tions under section 17(a), the Supreme Court examined the specific
language in the three subparagraphs of section 17(a).42 Section 17(a)(1) pro-
hibits the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" in the sale
of securities.43 Reasoning that the terms "device," "scheme," and "ar-
tifice" connote knowing or intentional practices, the Aaron Court con-
cluded that scienter is an element of proof in SEC actions to enjoin viola-
tions of section 17(a)(1)." The Court noted further that the term "device"
figured prominently in the Hochfelder determination that a scienter re-
quirement applies in SEC injunctive actions under section 10(b).45
The Supreme Court reached an opposite result, however, in con-
sidering whether the SEC must prove scienter to establish a violation
under the second and third subparagraphs of section 17(a).48 Section
17(a)(2) prohibits a seller from obtaining money or property by means of
a misstatement or omission of a material fact.4 ' The Aaron Court reasoned
that the plain meaning of the language of section 17(a)(2) did not suggest
a scienter requirement.48 The Court noted that the Hochfelder Court con-
ceded that similar language appearing in rule 10b-5(b) could be read to
proscribe any misstatement, omission, or conduct, whether intentional
or not, that had a deceptive effect upon the investing public.49 In addi-
tion, the Aaron Court found section 17(a)(3) devoid of a scienter require-
ment." Section 17(a)(3) prohibits any person from participating in "any
transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."5 The Court reasoned
that this particular provision focuses on the effect of the defendant's con-
duct on investors, rather than on the defendant's state of mind.2
certain acts between an "investment adviser" and "any client or prospective client." See
note 36 supra.
See 446 U.S. at 695-97; text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
See note 8 supra.
" 446 U.S. at 695-96.
Id- at 696.
Id. at 696-97.
', See note 8 supra.
'3 446 U.S. at 696 (citing 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1442 (2d ed. 1961)).
'3 446 U.S. at 696. Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits a person from making any untrue statement
of a material fact or omitting to state a material fact necessary to make statements made
not misleading. See note 4 supra. The Hochfelder Court acknowledged that this specific ter-
minology, if viewed in isolation, could proscribe either negligent or intentional behavior. 425
U.S. at 212. The Court, however, did not find that the Commission's language in rule 10b-5
controlled the construction of the rule. Id. at 212-14. The Commission adopted rule 10b-5
pursuant to authority granted in § 10(b). The scope and intent of § 10(b) controls the con-
struction of rule 10b-5. See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
0 446 U.S. at 696-97.
5, See note 8 supra.
446 U.S. at 696-97. The Aaron Court construed the language in § 17(a)(3) according to
the Capital Gains Court's construction of similar language in § 206(2). Id. at 697. In Capital
Gains, the Supreme Court noted that § 206(2) does not require a "showing [of] deliberate
dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors." 375 U.S. at 200. The Aaron
1981]
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The Supreme Court in Aaron held further that sections 20(b) and
21(d), which authorize the SEC to seek injunctive relief against viola-
tions of the '33 and '34 Acts, are devoid of any culpability requirement.
To obtain an injunction under these two provisions, the SEC must show
that a person is violating or about to violate a substantive provision of
the '33 and '34 Acts or a rule promulgated thereunder. 4 The Court noted
that to prove a violation -for the purpose of injunctive relief under sec-
tion 20(b) or section 21(d), the SEC must establish all elements of a
substantive violation, including scienter when necessary. 5  Thus,
although sections 20(b) and 21(d) do not have a culpability requirement,
the SEC will have to prove scienter to enjoin violations of a substantive
provision requiring scienter. The Supreme Court suggested that even
under provisions that lack a scienter requirement the SEC would have
to make a showing equivalent to scienter to obtain any injunction,
because courts assess a defendant's propensity to commit future viola-
tions of a provision on the basis of his prior intentional misconduct."
The Supreme Court in Aaron reasoned correctly that statutory
language and underlying legislative history, rather than policy con-
siderations, should control the construction of the federal securities
laws. The logical starting point in construing any statute is with an ex-
amination of the provision's specific language.57 When the terms define
clearly the prerequisites for an action pursuant to the statute, policy
consideratio ns, regardless of their appeal, should not contradict the
statute's express wording. 8 Hochfelder offers a sound interpretation of
Court observed further that the Supreme Court in United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768,
774 (1979), noted that each subparagraph of § 17(a) proscribed a distinct type of conduct. 446
U.S. at 697. The Aaron Court concluded that in light of the clear language in § 17(a)
prescribing a scienter requirement only under § 17(a)(1), only a definite expression of a con-
trary congressional intent in the legislative history of § 17(a) would justify a holding that
the language did not control. Id The Aaron Court rejected the SEC's argument that the
legislative history of § 17(a) indicated Congress' intent to require negligence under all three
subparagraphs of § 17(a). Id. at 697-700. But see text accompanying notes 72-76 infra.
446 U.S. at 700.
Id at 700-01; see notes 15-16 supra.
446 U.S. at 701. After Aaron, the SEC may establish a-violation of § 17(a)(1), § 10b,
and rule 10b-5, sufficient to warrant injunctive relief, only upon a showing of scienter. The
SEC may establish a violation of § 17(a)(2) and § 17(a)(3), however, upon proof of a
defendant's negligence. Proving a substantive violation does not necessarily establish the
other element necessary for issuance of an injunction, that future violations are likely to oc-
cur. See text accompanying notes 136-141 infra.
' 446 U.S. at 701; see text accompanying notes 138-141 infra.
"' See Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934) (construction of
statute unnecessary when language is unambiguous); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) (clear language of statute is conclusive).
,1! See Rubin v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 698, 701 (1981) (no further judicial inquiry
necessary when terms of statute unambiguous and court's reading of statute is consistent
with legislative history); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976)
(language and legislative history of § 10(b) dispositive of the appropriate standard of liabil-




the language of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Although the terms "device"
and "deceptive" are somewhat ambiguous, the words "manipulative"
and "contrivance" connote clearly'a scienter requirement." Moreover,
Hochfelder's interpretation of the language and legislative history of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 applies with equal force in support of a
scienter standard in SEC injunctive actions. At the time Congress
enacted section 10(b), Congress did not contemplate the judicially im-
plied private cause of action now recognized under section 10(b)." Thus,
Congress intended initially that section 10(b) apply only in Commission
enforcement proceedings.6 ' If the language and legislative history of sec-
tion 10(b) prescribe a scienter requirement in private damage actions,
the same culpability standard must apply, therefore, in SEC injunctive
actions under section 10(b). Since the Commission has authority to adopt
only rules and regulations that accord with the requirements of the
authorizing statute, a scienter requirement under section 10(b) dictates a
similar standard under rule 10b-5.
6 2
Contrary to the Aaron Court's conclusion, the statutory language of
section 17(a)(1) does not provide clear guidance on the provision's proper
construction. Section 17(a)(1) proscribes the use of "any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud" in the. sale of securities."3 The Supreme Court
acknowledged possible ambiguity surrounding the word "defraud"64 but
I See Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 71 (1908) (word "device" need
not connote'scienter); People v. Wahl, 3 Cal. App. Supp. 196, 197, 100 P.2d 550, 551 (Super.
Ct. 1940) ("deceptive" does not necessarily imply intent to deceive). The Hochfelder Court
noted tlat the word 'manipulative" is a term of art when used in connection with securities
markets to connote intentional or willful conduct. 425 U.S. at 199; see BLACK'S LAw DIc-
TIONARY 868 (5th ed. 1979). The term "contrivance" means a device arranged to deceive. See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979).
o See 425 U.S. at 196. Congress expressly authorized the SEC to seek injunctive
relief, pursuant to § 21(d), for violations of § 10(b). See note 16 supra. Nothing in the
language of § 10(b), nor in the language of any other provision, indicates that a private cause
of action exists for violation of § 10(b). Further, the legislative history of § 10(b) is devoid df
any reference to a private cause of action. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 729 (1975) (no indication in history of § 10(b) that Congress considered a private
cause of action); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. L. REV. 627, 656-60 (1963) (questioning appropriateness of private cause of
action under § 10(b) because unsupported in legislative history). In § 9 of the '34 Act,
however, Congress expressly created a private cause of action against violations of the pro-
visions of § 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). Despite any doubt concerning the appropriateness of
a private cause of action under § 10(b), the remedy is well established. See Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
e, See 425 U.S. at 196; note 60 supra.
2 See 425 U.S. at 212-14; Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Manhatten
Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
See note 8 supra.
446 U.S. at 696. The definition of the word "fraud" controls the construction of the
term "defraud." See BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 324-25 (3d ed. 1969). At common law,
fraud had a different meaning in equity than in law. In equity, the concept of fraud did not
encompass scienter. In an action for fraud in law, scienter was an essential element of proof.
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
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concluded, nonetheless, that the terms "device," "scheme," and
"artifice" connoted knowing or intentional behavior." Although the term
"device" was among the terminology in Hochfelder found to support a
scienter requirement under section 10(b), the word appeared in conjunc-
tion with the terms "manipulative," "deceptive," and "contrivance.""6
The additional terms provide substantial support to the finding of a
scienter standard under section 10(b). Coupled with the words "scheme"
and "artifice," however, the term "device" in section 17(a)(1) does not
necessarily imply conduct constituting scienter" In fact, the Supreme
Court recognized in construing the language of the Elkins Act68 that the
term "device" could connote less culpable behavior than scienter.69 To in-
terpret section 17(a)(1), therefore, determining the proper construction
of the terms "scheme" and "artifice" is essential. Although these two
words may refer to a devious course of action, the terms also may define
an organized plan or strategy."0 While a "plan" or "strategy" implies a
degree of knowledge on behalf of an actor, these terms are not as sug-
gestive of intentional misconduct as the phrases "manipulative" and
"willfully" that Congress employed in securities laws requiring
scienter.71
Furthermore, the legislative history of section 17(a) does not clarify
whether Congress intended to prescribe a scienter requirement. As
originally drafted, section 17(a) included the term "willfully" among its
provisions." Congress also considered adding the phrase "with intent to
446 U.S. at 696.
" See 425 U.S at 197-99; note 3 supra. The Hochfelder Court singled out only the term
"manipulative" as especially significant in proving the existence of a scienter requirement
in private actions under § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 199. The Court noted that the word manipula-
tive was a "term of art" in the securities field that connotes intentional or willful conduct
for the purpose of deceiving investors. Id.
" See 73 Am. JUR. 2d Statutes § 213 (1974) (meaning of particular terms in statute
ascertained by reference to words associated with them in statute).
49 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). The Elkins Act proscribes the use of certain devices by ship-
pers in interstate commerce to effect a rebate, concession, or rate discrimination. Id.
" See Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 71 (1908) (meaning of term
"device" not limited to dishonest or fraudulent conduct). The legislative history of the '34
Act provides further support that the word "device" does not necessarily connote scienter.
In fact, Congress used the term as a synonym for the word "practice" in the Senate version
of § 17(a)(1). See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1934); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 686,
707 (1980) (Blaclmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The term "device" also
appears in § 15(c)(1) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976). The legislative history of § 15
explicitly indicates that the provision applies to negligent conduct. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.15cl-2 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1938).
70 See 446 U.S. at 696 n.13; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 103, 1206 (5th ed. 1979).
" Compare § 9(e) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) ("any person who willfully par-
ticipates") and § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976) ("any person . . . [t]o employ . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance") with § 17(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(1) (1976)
("a person ... [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud").
72 446 U.S. at 697-98. The current § 17(a) first appeared in Congress as § 13. This provi-
sion prohibited any person "willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud..."
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defraud" to the statutory language in section 17(a).73 Section 17(a) does
not contain any of the above terminology. 4 In addition, the legislative
history contains no explanation for the exclusion of the language. The
Aaron Court reasoned that plain meaning of the language in section
17(a)(1) made the inclusion of this terminology unnecessary." Another
reasonable explanation for the absence of this language in the final ver-
sion is that Congress considered and rejected a scienter requirement for
section 17(a)(1).
76
Assuming the Aaron Court decided correctly that the language of
section 17(a)(1) suggests a scienter requirement, an equally persuasive
policy argument supports application of a scienter standard under all
three subparagraphs of section 17(a). Section 17(a) applies only to the
misrepresentations of sellers of securities.77 Any action brought against
a seller under section 17(a) may be brought in conjunction with an action
under section 10(b), which applies to both purchasers and sellers of
H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (March 29, 1933); S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (March 29,
1933); see 446 U.S. at 697-98. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
and the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency held hearings on § 13. Subsequently,
the House Committee adopted a version of § 13 with the word "willfully" deleted. See H.R.
5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16(a) (May 4, 1933). The legislative history is devoid of any
reason for the deletion. Congress enacted the House version, with minor changes, into law
as § 17. See 446 U.S. at 698 & n.16.
" 446 U.S. at 699. During hearings on the current § 17(a), the House Committee re-
jected a proposal to modify the terminology "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice" with
the phrase "with intent to defraud." See Hearings on H.R. 4314 before the House Commit-
tee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 146 (1933).
7' See note 8 supra.
" 446 U.S. at 699-700. The SEC argued that Congress' deliberate exclusion of the term
"willfully" and the phrase "with intent to defraud" in § 17(a) indicated that Congress con-
sidered and rejected a scienter requirement under § 17(a). Id. at 699. The Aaron Court
declined to draw the inference required by the SEC's argument in the absence of an express
legislative intent in support of the inference. Id. The Court further suggested that the plain
meaning of the terms in § 17(a)(1) made the excluded phrases redundant. Id.
" In Aaron, the SEC argued that Congress rejected a scienter requirement under §
17(a). 446 U.S. at 699. The Court found the plain meaning of the statute controlling. Id. at
699-700; note 75 supra. The ambiguous nature of the terms in § 17(a)(1), which the Aaron
Court found to suggest a scienter requirement, weakens, however, the Court's assertion
that the clear language in § 17(a)(1) made the inclusion of the phrases "willfully" and "with
intent to defraud" unnecessary. See text accompanying notes 63-71 supra. Moreover, dis-
senting Justice Blackmun noted that the House Conference Report, discussing the dif-
ferences between the original and final House Committee version of § 17(a), indicated that
the final version included "minor and clarifying changes" intended "to make clear and effec-
tive the administrative procedure provided for and to remove uncertainties" concerning the
SEC's powers. 446 U.S. at 706 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1933). One of the changes made was
the exclusion of the term "with intent to defraud." Justice Blackmun suggested that if Con-
gress intended a scienter requirement under § 17(a)(1), retention, instead of exclusion, of the
phrase "with intent to defraud" would have furthered Congress' goal of clarifying § 17(a).
446 U.S. at 706 n.l (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I See 446 U.S. at 687; note 8 supra.
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securities.78 A scienter requirement in SEC injunctive actions against a
seller's violation of section 10(b) is meaningless, however,.if the SEC may
enjoin the negligent misrepresentations of the seller under sections
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). The effectiveness of the strict scienter approach
under section 10(b), therefore, depends on whether sellers are subject to
a similar requirement under section 17(a). The Aaron Court's determina-
tion that scienter is not an element of section 17(a)(2) and section 17(a)(3)
violations undermines the scienter requirement in section 10(b) by
creating a loophole for the SEC to enjoin the negligent misrepresenta-
tions of sellers.
79
In Aaron, the SEC relied heavily on the Supreme Court's earlier
decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc." to support their
argument that negligence is the proper standard of culpability in injunc-
tive actions.81 In Capital Gains, policy considerations persuaded the
Court that a negligence standard should apply in Commission enforce-
ment proceedings against violations of section 206(2) of the '40 Act.2 The
Capital Gains Court did not rely on the specific language in the '40 Act,
but focused instead on the Act's legislative history.83 The Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 regulates the fiduciary relationship between an in-
vestment adviser and his client. 4 The legislative history of the Act in-
dicates that Congress desired to prevent certain violations of this
fiduciary duty regardless of the violating actor's state of mind." Fur-
ther, the Capital Gains Court held that a distinction between common
law fraud in law and in equity implied that the Commission should not be
held to a strict scienter standard.88 In common law fraud and deceit ac-
tions the elements of proof for equitable relief were less exacting than
the elements in an action for money damages where proof of intent to
deceive was generally necessary.87 Equitable remedies at common law
often were less detrimental to a defendant than monetary damages aimed
78 See 446 U.S. at 687; note 3 supra.
7' See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 715 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (holding drives wedge between provisions of § 10(b) and § 17(a) and says
"henceforth only the seller's negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined").
'o 375 U.S. 180 (1963); see note 37 supra.
446 U.S. at 691-95.
See 375 U.S. at 186-95; text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
See 375 U.S. at 186-92; note 39 supra.
" See 375 U.S. at 191; notes 39 & 40 supra.
See 375 U.S. at 191-92; note 39 supra.
See 375 U.S. at 192-95.
87 See 446 U.S. at 693. An action for misrepresentation or deceit at common law re-
quired proof of scienter. See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 339 (1889); 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION, 1431 (2d ed. 1961). Equitable relief, however, could issue upon a
showing of negligence or innocent mistake. See Redgrave v. Hurd, 20 Ch. D. 1, 12 (Ch. App.




at punishing the defendant for wrongdoing." Reasoning that an SEC ac-
tion for injunctive relief would have only a "mild prophylactic" effect
on the defendant as compared to the punitive effects associated with
monetary damages, the Capital Gains Court concluded that proof of
scienter was not a prerequisite to the SEC's injunctive action.89
The Aaron Court reasoned correctly that the Capital Gains analysis
of section 206(2) should not control the construction of section 10(b).90 Sec-
tion 206(2) proscribes any practice "which operates as a fraud or
deceit."9 Nothing in the language of section 206 implies specifically the
existence of a scienter requirement. In contrast, the terminology appear-
ing in section 10(b) connotes scienter 2 Moreover, the Capital Gains
Court took guidance from the legislative history, which indicated Con-
gress' lack of concern with an investment adviser's specific state of mind
under section 206(2)." Although the clear language in section 10(b) makes
reliance on the legislative history unnecessary, the legislative history of
section 10(b), nonetheless, indicates a scienter requirement. 4 Capital
Gains'reliance on the distinction between fraud in law and in equity also
should not determine the proper culpability standard in all SEC injunc-
tive actions. Capital Gains involved a provision regulating a fiduciary
relationship. Even in a common law fraud action for damages, the plain-
tiff need not prove scienter when the defendant owed a fiduciary duty to
the deceived party. 8 Moreover, the Capital Gains Court's assumption
that an injunction is only a "mild prophylactic" remedy, lacking the
punitive effect of monetary damages, ignores the possible consequences
that may result from an injunction.
The direct effect of an SEC injunction is to order the defendant to
correct any misconduct or refrain from future conduct that violates or
may violate the securities laws. An injunction, however, also may have
" See 446 U.S. at 693. At common law, equitable relief resulted in undoing the transac-
tion. Common equitable remedies were recission, reformation of contract, and equitable
liens. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 387-88 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. Injunctive relief was available also, but extended only to past
misrepresentations, not to prohibit future misconduct. See POMEROY, supra note 87, at 577.
" 375 U.S. at 193-95. The Supreme Court's implicit equating of equitable remedies at
common law with an SEC injunction ignores the harsher effects of an SEC injunction. See,
text accompanying notes 97-110 infra.
See text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
" See note 36 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 29, 30 & 59 supra.
See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
'5 See 375 U.S. at 190-91. See note 40 supra.
See 375 U.S. at 192-94. The Capital Gains Court observed that in a damage suit be-
tween parties to an arm's length transaction, intent and injury are necessary elements of
proof. Id. at 192. The Court noted, however, that in a similar suit against a fiduciary, proof
of these elements was unnecessary. Id. at 193-94. See also PROSSER, supra note 88, at 534-535
(fiduciary has affirmative duty not to act negligently).
11 See E. GADSBY, 11A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: THE FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE
1981]
930 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
indirect punitive effects upon a defendant. A defendant that fails to com-
ply with any injunctive order may subject himself to prosecution for civil
or criminal contempt.98 Even if the defendant complies with the injunc-
tion, he may lose certain rights and privileges available to him under the
'33 Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940.91 A defendant sub-
jected to an injunction also may be disqualified from professional prac-
tice before the SEC,"' or have his broker-dealer registration revoked or
suspended.' ' When the enjoined defendant is a corporation, the SEC
may seek ancillary relief by means of disgorgement of profits,'012 or ap-
pointment of a receiver, 3 special counsel, or interim director to ensure
the corporation's compliance with the securities laws."' An injunction
against any defendant may expose the defendant to civil liability in
private damage actions."' The cost of defending against an SEC injunc-
tion and any resulting civil liability is often staggering."' Moreover, an
individual's or firm's reputation is essential to success in the in-
ACT OF 1934 § 9.03[1] n.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GADSBY] (discussing power of courts
upon application by SEC to demand defendant's compliance with securities laws).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); Matthews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal
Securities Laws and Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal
Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 946-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Matthews].
" The SEC may exempt certain classes of securities from registration requirements.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1980). An issuer of securities loses this exemption privilege by
operation of law if any official of the issuer or under'vriter is enjoined from violating the
securities laws. Id. § 230.252(d). The SEC may lift or waive the disqualification after applica-
tion and hearing on the matter. Id. § 230.252(f). Section 9(a)(2) of the Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-9(a)(2) (1976), bars any party from serving or acting in any capacity with
an advisory board, investment adviser, depositor, or underwriter of a registered investment
firm if that party is subject to an SEC injunction. The SEC also may remove this dis-
qualification. § 9(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(c) (1976).
® 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1980). The SEC may issue an injunction that temporarily
suspends the privilege of practicing before the SEC for any attorney, accountant, engineer,
or other professional or expert who is enjoined permanently from violating the securities
laws. Id. The temporary suspension becomes permanent unless the suspended party peti-
tions for a hearing. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(ii). In the hearing, the party cannot contest the prior in-
junction. Id. at § 201.2(e)(3)(iv). The only issues in the hearing are whether the injunction is
permanent and whether disqualification is proper. Id.
15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(4), (5) (1976); 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(e), (f) (1976); see James F. Morrisey, 25
S.E.C. 372, 381 (1947) (SEC registration revoked); Charles C. Wilson, 1 S.E.C. 402, 407 (1936)
(registration refused).
o See SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1327, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
103 See SEC v. Charles Plohn & Co., 443 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Bartlett,
422 F.2d 475, 476 (8th Cir. 1970).
104 See Comment, Equitable Remedies In SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 PA. L. REV.
1188, 1204-10 (1975).
1 0 See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (defendants in
damage action collaterally estopped from relitigating misleading proxy statement issue
determined in prior injunctive action).
I" See Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J.
759, 761 (1976) (noting enormous expense of defending SEC fraud suits).
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vestments field.' 1 The adverse publicity that surrounds the issuance of
an injunction may harm a defendant's personal and business
reputation.'8 Even if the SEC fails to obtain an injunction, the defendant
must conduct business under allegations of fraudulent behavior until the
court denies the injunction." 9 The punitive aspects of an SEC injunction,
therefore, weaken the policy arguments in favor of holding the SEC to a
negligence standard.10
The Supreme Court's reasoning that scienter is an element in SEC
injunctive actions under section 17(a)(1), section 10(b), and rule 10b-5 may
affect subsequent courts' construction of the prerequisites to injunctive
relief under other antifraud provisions with language suggestive of a
scienter requirement."' For example, section 9 of the '34 Act regulates
practices that manipulate the market price of securities.1 2 Under section
9(e), Congress established a scienter requirement in private actions by
authorizing expressly a cause of action for damages against any person
who "willfully" participates in an act or transaction that violates the pro-
visions of section 92 "3 Although courts have not determined whether
scienter is an element in SEC injunctive actions under section 9, the
language of section 9(a) connotes clearly a scienter requirement. Section
9(a) prohibits certain acts performed for the purpose of manipulating the
price of securities. 4 Since the Supreme Court has found the term
&&manipulative" to be a term of art in the securities field that connotes
scienter,"5 courts should require the SEC to prove scienter as a prere-
quisite to injunctive relief against section 9(a) violations."6
A scienter requirement is appropriate also in SEC injunctive actions
under the tender offer provisions of section 14(e) of the '34 Act."7 Section
14(e) prohibits a person from engaging in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
"7 See GADSBY. supra note 97, at § 9.03[1] n.39.
,01 See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC V.
Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC
Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 328, 342 (1974).
'7 See GADSBY. supra note 97, at § 9.03[1] n.39.
" See text accompanying notes 81-89 supra.
Ill See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
113 Id. § 78i(e); see 425 U.S. at 207.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1976).
"' See 425 U.S. at 199; note 59 supra. Congress entitled § 9 "Manipulation of Security
Prices." The provisions of § 9 proscribe certain manipulative acts that affect the price of
securities. For example, § 9(a)(1) prohibits any person from performing certain acts "[flor the
purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading" in any registered
security. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1). Section 9(a)(2) prohibits acts effected "for the purpose of induc-
ing the purchase or sale" of any security. Id. § 78i(a)(2). Similar language proscribing inten-
tional acts that manipulate the market price of a security appears in subsections (3)-(6) of §
9(a). Id. § 78i(a)(3)-(6).
Il See SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) (SEC must prove scienter as prerequisite
to injunctive relief when scienter is element of substantive violation).
... 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
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manipulative act or practice in connection with a tender offer."1 8 This
language in 14(e) is similar to the language in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
that the Aaron Court recognized to prescribe scienter."' Courts have
held that scienter is an element of private damage actions under section
14(e). '2 Since the language and legislative history of section 14(e) does
not suggest that Congress intended the scienter requirement to apply
only in private damage actions, the scienter standard should extend to
SEC injunctive actions under section 14(e).' 2'
The Aaron Court's reasoning that the language and legislative
history of a statute control the construction of a substantive provision
should not support, however, a scienter standard in SEC injunctive ac-
tions where a court, for policy reasons only, determines that a substan-
tive provision without statutory language connoting scienter requires
proof of scienter in private actions. Section 14(a) of the '34 Act prohibits
a person from violating SEC rules and regulations adopted pursuant to
the proxy solicitation provisions of section 14(a).122 Rule 14a-9(a), pro-
mulgated under section 14(a), prohibits solicitation by means of proxy or
other communication containing a statement that "is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading."'2 Nothing in the language of section 14(a) or rule 14a-9(a) in-
dicates a scienter requirement.'2 4 In fact, the terminology in the two pro-
visions is similar to the language in section 17(a)(2) of the '33 Act, which
the Aaron Court found not to manifest a scienter standard. 25 Several
courts have held negligence to be the proper culpability standard in
judicially implied private damage actions under section 14(a).'28 The
18 Id.
"I See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976);
text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
'" See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1980);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1973).
See also A&K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R. Co., 437 F. Supp. 636, 642 (E.D.
Wis. 1977) (scienter is element in private injunctive action under § 14(e)).
"' See 446 U.S. at 701. The language and legislative history of a statute are the same
regardless of the plaintiff or the nature of an action. 446 U.S. at 691. Courts have found the
language and legislative history of § 14(e) to prescribe a scienter requirement in private
causes of action under § 14(e). See text accompanying note 120 supra. Accordingly, the same
language and legislative history should support a scienter standard in SEC injunctive ac-
tions, unless restricted by Congress to only private damage actions.
'= 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
,,' 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1980).
,u See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, .429 (6th Cir. 1980).
12 See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
126 See Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973); Berman v. Thomson,
403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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Sixth Circuit in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc.,2 ' recently
established, however, a scienter standard for violations of section 14(a)
by outside corporate directors and accountants, despite the clear
language in section 14(a) indicating a neglige.ece standard. 2 8 In Adams,
the Court noted that a negligence standard in private damage actions
under section 14(a) may subject directors and accountants to substantial
monetary liability for minor, unintentional mistakes involving proxies.
12 9
Reasoning that an outside director or accountant does not directly
benefit from a proxy vote and is not in privity with stockholders, the
Adams court concluded on policy grounds that outside directors and ac-
countants should not incur liability under section 14(a) or rule 14a-9(a) for
negligent mistakes. 3 ' These policy considerations that support a
scienter standard in private damage actions under section 14(a) or rule
14a-9(a) should not control,' however, the construction of the proper
culpability standard in SEC enforcement proceedings, which impose no
monetary liability upon a negligent defendant. Moreover, the clear
language of a statute, not policy considerations, should control the con-
struction of a substantive provision in express actions.1 3' Although a
court may inject a scienter standard in implied private damage actions
under section 14(a), a court should not inject a scienter requirement in ex-
press SEC injunctive actions in the absence of language in section 14(a)
suggesting scienter as the proper culpability standard for liability.
Courts and commentators have suggested that imposition of a
scieriter requirement will increase the SEC's burden in injunctive ac-
tions and impair the effectiveness of the SEC in providing.protection to
the investing public. 32 The practical effect of a scienter standard in SEC
" 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980).
- "8 .k at 428.
' See id. But see Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d
Cir. 1976) (negligence proper standard under § 14(a) for outside directors).
'" 623 F.2d at 428. The Adams court noted that federal courts created the private right
of action under § 14, and thus the courts must consider the consequences of their rul-
ings and mold liability fairly to account for the parties' circumstances. Id. Reasoning that
rule 14a-9 is similar to rule lOb-5 because both rules require materiality instead of reliance,
the Adams court concluded that the scienter standard of § 10(b) should apply to accountants
under § 14(a) and rule 14a-9(a). Id. at 429. The court further observed that language in the
legislative history of § 14 (a) suggested that Congress hoped § 14(a) would protect investors
against the "promiscuous" solicitation of proxies by "irresponsible outsiders" and
"unscrupulous corporate officials" who conceal and distort facts. Id. The Adams court con-
strued this language in the legislative history to connote a scienter requirement for cor-
porate outsiders. Id. at 430. Contra, Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F.
Supp. 853, 858-864 (D. Del. 1972), affd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (legislative history of §
14(a) does not suggest a scienter requirement).
'"' See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); .note 57 supra.
'12 See 375 U.S. at 200; SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 1979); Note, Securities
Regulation, 5 J. CORP. L. 377, 381 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Securities Regulation]; Note,
The Scienter Requirement in an SEC Enforcement Action-Should Equity Control? 5
DAYTON L. Rav. 217, 230 (1980).
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injunctive actions may not be this severe. In fact, the scienter require-
ment deprives only investors harmed by negligent misrepresentations of
protection.1 3 Investors harmed by intentional misrepresentations do not
lose any protection since intentional misconduct is enjoinable under
either a negligence or scienter standard. Moreover, a defendant who
acts negligently and causes harm to innocent investors may remain
susceptible to liability in common law negligence actions for damages.'34
Further, a defendant has incentive to avoid fraudulent conduct, whether
intentional or negligent, because he may cause harm to his reputation in
the financial investments field and thereby affect his business
interests.'
In addition, a scienter standard does not impose a new disability
upon the Commission, since courts generally have denied injunctions
when the defendant acted negligently. 3 ' Sections 20(b) and 21(d) author-
ize the SEC to seek an injunction only when the SEC demonstrates
that a person is engaged or about the to engage in an act that the
federal securities laws prohibit.'37 Although neither section 20(b) nor sec-
tion 21(d) dictates the necessity of establishing a prior violation as a
prerequisite to injunctive relief, courts often have declined to grant an
injunction unless the SEC makes a prima facie showing that a violation
occurred and that the violation is likely to recur.'3 ' In discussing the
13 See Securities Regulation, supra note 132, at 392.
'3, Cf. SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 702 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) (Carter, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (noting that defendants possibly subject to com-
mon law negligence suits for diversion of corporate funds); see Brodsky, Suing Brokerage
Firm for Negligence Under State Law, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
'" See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972) (court
recognition of importance of reputation).
13' See SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 700-02 (9th Cir. 1978) (regardless
whether § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violated by negligent conduct, injunction properly denied
where no evidence of future misconduct); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,
810-811 (2d Cir. 1975) (despite application of negligence standard, injunction improper unless
defendant knew or should have known statements would mislead); SEC v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1161-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (injunction inappropriate where
defendant's violations not for purpose of misleading investors), modified on other grounds
sub nom., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F. 2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973); SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (negligent violation could not support finding of likelihood of future misconduct); Brod-
sky, Willfulness in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 1, at 2,
col. 3 (noting tendency of courts to deny injunctive relief absent evidence of scienter).
'" See notes 15 & 16 supra. Since the SEC derives its injunctive powers from statute,
the SEC need not establish irreparable harm and absence of an adequate remedy at law as
required of private plaintiffs in private injunctive actions. See SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450
(2d Cir. 1937). The Commission must establish, however, the elements of the authorizing
statute. See 446 U.S. at 700-01; SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir.
1976).
"' See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975). Evidence of past violations,
without proof that such conduct is likely to recur, will not meet prerequisites to an SEC in-
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prerequisites to injunctive relief, the Aaron Court noted that the
presence or absence of scienter in a defendant's past misconduct has a
significant bearing on a court's determination of whether the defendant
will commit future violations."3 9 In his concurring opinion in Aaron, Chief
Justice Burger observed further that to show a reasonable likelihood of
a future violation, the SEC almost always will have to demonstrate that
a defendant's past conduct resulted from more than negligence. " The
Chief Justice noted that courts are not likely to enjoin a defendant
whose past actions have been in good faith.' Since an isolated and un-
characteristic act of negligence may not provide an adequate basis for
determining the reasonable likelihood of future misconduct, a scienter
requirement exists implicitly in all SEC injunctive actions regardless of
whether the language of a substantive provision connotes scienter.
Although courts are reluctant to enjoin a fraudulent practice arising
out of a single negligent act, a defendant may not participate in
fraudulent acts indefinitely. Courts that recognize scienter to include
knowing or reckless misconduct may hold that once the defendant
receives notice from the SEC or an interested party that his fraudulent
acts have deceptive effects, the continuation of these acts establishes
scienter."' Thus, the actual effect of a scienter requirement on negligent
practices may be only to delay a Commission injunctive proceeding until
the defendant receives notice and fails to take steps to prevent the prac-
tices from continuing in the future.'
junction. See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d at 541. Courts suggest, however,
that evidence of a past violation raises an inference of future violations. See SEC v.
Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 698 (9th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.,
417 F. Supp. 1225, 1248-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
855 (1977).
13 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
446 U.S. at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" Id.; see text accompanying note 136 supra.
1.. See SEC v. Aaron, No. 77-6091 (2d Cir. Jan. 27, 1981) (defendant's failure to prevent
fraudulent practices from continuing after receiving notice of practice establishes his
scienter). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 886 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that repeated violations lead to inference of purposeful con-
duct). By analogy, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976) provides
statutory authority for the principle that continuing failure to correct conduct that is unfair
or deceptive following notice may constitute a violation sufficient to impose an injunction or
civil penalty upon the actor. See 15 U.S.C. § 45m(1)(c) (1976) (continuing failure to comply
with Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order constitutes a separate violation for
each day deceptive practices continue).
"' The defendant may receive notice from an interested party. See 446 U.S. at 683
(issuing corporation's attorney notifying defendant of misrepresentations). The SEC also
may contact a defendant and inform him of his deceptive conduct. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra
note 13, at § 8.02[1]. The SEC may warn the party to cease any deceptive conduct. Id. This
caution to the party, often called an "office injunction," provides the SEC an opportunity to
seek a voluntary consent decree from the party that he will discontinue his practices
without the SEC resorting to a federal district court for an injunctive order. Id.
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The Supreme Court's determination in Aaron v. SEC that scienter is
an element of proof in SEC injunctive actions under section 17(a)(1), sec-
tion 10(b), and rule 10b-5 of the securities laws resolves a controversy
that has long divided the federal courts.' Although the SEC must now
prove scienter whenever scienter is an express element of a violation
that the SEC seeks to enjoin, 4 - this requirement should not have a
significant impact on the SEC civil enforcement process.' Several
courts previously have recognized scienter as an implicit element in SEC
injunctive actions."4 " Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision does not
place all negligent actions beyond the scope of the SEC's injunctive
powers. Repeated negligent violations of the securities laws may con-
stitute culpable behavior sufficient to establish scienter."'I The negligent
acts of sellers of securities also remain enjoinable despite a scienter re-
quirement under section 17(a)(1) and section 10(b), since scienter is not an
element of violations of sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3).1
49
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.4 446 U.S. at 701-02; text accompanying note 6 supra.
145 See 446 U.S. at 701.
See id. at 703 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (scienter issue in injunctive actions is "much
ado about nothing"); text accompanying notes 133-143 supra.
... See text accompanying note 136 supra.
,' See text accompanying notes 142-143 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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